Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Since Weitzman's (1984) much-noticed book on the "Share Economy" there has been a remarkably growing interest in profit sharing. This interest has been spurred by the idea that shared capitalism may contribute to both increased firm performance and improved employee well-being (Blasi et al. 2016 , Freeman et al. 2010a . Against this background, a series of econometric studies have examined the determinants of profit sharing use. 1 Those studies usually focus on objective firm characteristics such as firm size, technology, work organization or employee representation. Management's subjective view towards profit sharing is not taken into account as a determinant. The omission of this subjective factor would not be an issue if management's attitude is nothing more than a reflection of objective circumstances. Yet, if management's view towards profit sharing is not completely determined by the firm's circumstances, it may be an independent determinant of profit sharing. As noted by Kruse (1996) , employer discretion plays a large role in the adoption of profit sharing. This discretion leaves room for managers to follow their subjective attitudes. Thus, taking managers' attitudes into account can advance our understanding of the factors that influence the adoption of profit sharing.
A deeper understanding of these factors is also important from a policy viewpoint.
A series of OECD countries have implemented policy measures to promote profit sharing (OECD 1995 , Perotin and Robinson 2003 , Poutsma et al. 1999 ).
Implementing effective policy measures requires in-depth knowledge of the determinants that lead firms to adopt profit sharing.
This study uses German establishment data to examine the role of managers' attitudes in the adoption and termination of profit sharing. The results show that establishments are more likely to adopt profit sharing if management has a very positive view towards profit sharing. On the one hand, to some extent this entails failed experimentation. Managers with initially positive attitudes adopt profit sharing plans that turn out to be a failure. In this case, the plans are dropped in the end. On the other hand, positive managerial attitudes can substantially contribute to a sustained use of profit sharing. This supports the view that a supportive managerial environment is required to strengthen positive incentive effects of profit sharing. In that case, positive managerial attitudes involve a reduced likelihood that profit sharing is terminated.
While most of the examinations on the determinants of profit sharing have paid no attention to subjective factors, a notable exception is a study by Long (1997) . Using data from Canada, he finds that managerial philosophy has an influence on both the use of profit sharing and the intention to introduce profit sharing. Thus, his study reaches a conclusion similar to ours about the role of subjective factors. Apart from that, Long's study and our analysis differ in several ways. First, like most other examinations on the determinants of profit sharing, his study is cross-sectional. By contrast, our analysis provides detailed insights into the dynamics of the use of profit sharing. Second, Long finds that almost exclusively management philosophy plays a role in the use of profit sharing. Our analysis provides evidence that both subjective factors and objective firm characteristics are determinants of profit sharing. The analysis demonstrates that taking subjective and objective factors jointly into account can substantially improve estimation results.
On a broader scale, our analysis also contributes to literature on management style and corporate behavior (Bamber et al. 2010 , Bertrand and Schoar 2003 , Graham et al. 2013 , Kaplan et al. 2012 , Malmendier and Tate 2005 . That literature examines the role of manager-specific influences such as overconfidence, optimism and resoluteness on investment, capital structure, financial disclosure, and mergers and acquisitions. Our analysis shows that managers' attitudes also play a role in human resource management.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section provides the background discussion. The third section presents the data and variables while the fourth section provides the estimation results. The fifth section concludes.
Background Discussion
In this section, we first discuss objective firm characteristics associated profit sharing and then turn to a discussion of managers' subjective attitudes. Starting with the objective firm characteristics helps clarify the role of subjective factors in the adoption of profit sharing.
Objective Firm Characteristics and the Incentive Effects of Profit Sharing
One important reason for analyzing the objective firm characteristics associated with the use of profit sharing is that the incentive effects of profit sharing can depend on circumstances and type of firm. In order to motivate workers, employers face a choice between various incentive schemes such individual-based performance pay, group-based performance pay or firm-wide incentives. Examining the firm characteristics that lead employers to adopt profit sharing yields insights into the circumstances under which profit sharing is a suitable incentive scheme.
However, some authors doubt that profit sharing has any positive incentive effects at all (e.g., Oyer 2004) . Profit sharing potentially suffers from a free rider problem among workers. The incentive to exert effort dissipates as the returns to that effort are distributed among all workers participating in the profit sharing scheme. The free rider problem gets more severe as the number of workers increases. That would imply that specifically larger firms should avoid using profit sharing. The empirical evidence does not support this prediction. Most empirical studies find either no or even a positive association between firm size and profit sharing. This indicates that firms may find ways to mitigate or solve the free rider problem. Possible ways to overcome the free rider problem are repeated games (Che and Yoo 2001, MacLeod 1988) , mutual monitoring and peer pressure (Carpenter et al. 2009 , Freeman et al. 2010 , Kandel and Lazear 1992 , Knez and Simester 2001 , reciprocity and co-worker altruism (Cornelissen et al. 2014 , Rotemberg 1994 , and production technologies characterized by a high degree of worker interdependence (Adams 2006, Heywood and Jirjahn 2009 ).
Nonetheless even in the presence of a free rider problem profit sharing can have specific advantages over other performance pay schemes. If work is characterized by multitasking, workers must allocate their efforts across different tasks. Individual performance measures are often unavailable for all tasks. An emphasis on individual performance as measured by one or a few indicators causes workers to cut back on productive behaviors for which they are not rewarded (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) .
Theses behaviors include helping colleagues, maintaining equipment, cultivating customer goodwill, striving for quality and reducing chances of workplace injury. In contrast to individual performance pay, profit sharing provides incentives to exert effort in all activities that are relevant to the firm's profit (Baker 2002 , Drago and Turnbull 1988 , Jirjahn 2000 . Relatedly, profit sharing provides incentives for flexibility as it increases workers' willingness to respond to internal productivity shocks and changes in external market conditions Turnbull 1991, Jirjahn 1998: pp. 97-101) . All in all, this suggests that firms should be more likely to adopt profit sharing if the nature of production is characterized by complex and multifaceted tasks. Empirical studies confirm that indicators of multitasking such as high skill requirements, flexible work assignments, rotation among wide ranges of tasks, employee involvement groups, and self-managing teams are positively associated with profit sharing (see Heywood and Jirjahn 2006 for a survey).
Furthermore, investments in human capital may stimulate the use of sharing schemes as such schemes can help safeguard the investments. If investments in the general or specific human capital of the employees play an important role in the firm's performance, profit sharing may be adopted to reduce the risks associated with these investments and, hence, to strengthen the incentives to undertake the investments (Green and Heywood 2011 , Guery and Pendleton 2014 , Robinson and Zhang 2005 . On the one hand, an employer providing general training for employees bears the risk that the investment is wasted if employees leave the firm after they have the received the training.
To the extent profit sharing reduces the risk of separations, it increases the expected return to the training investment. On the other hand, employees face a risk if they invest in their firm-specific human capital. The employer may capture the rents generated from the firm-specific investments by withholding promised wage increases or promotions. A profit sharing contract mitigates this hold-up problem as it ensures that employees participate in the rents generated by their specific human capital.
However, profit sharing can involve its own risks. Employees face the risk that the employer does not pursue complementary investments designed to increase financial performance. Moreover, employees run the risk that the employer tries to save costs by underreporting profit (Kurtulus et al. 2011 . A works council can facilitate the adoption of effective profit sharing plans by creating binding commitments of the employer. It can monitor the accounting of profit and can participate in decisions that influence the financial performance of the firm.
The Role of Managers' Attitudes
If the adoption of profit sharing were completely determined by objective firm characteristics, managers' subjective attitudes would play no role. Profit sharing would be used in situations that lead to a comparative advantage of this incentives scheme over alternative payment methods. It would not be used in situations that lead to a comparative disadvantage. However, to the extent managers have discretionary power in decision making, their subjective attitudes enter into the decision to adopt profit sharing for employees.
The economic literature usually focuses on the incentives that induce managers to use their discretionary power in a productive way (Murphy 1999 (Murphy , 2013 . Managerial profit sharing provides incentives to take measures in order to increase firm performance.
These measures can involve the adoption of profit sharing for employees ). Yet, even if managers have an incentive to increase firm performance, uncertainty remains about the way in which performance can be increased. Thus, the adoption of profit sharing for employees not only depends on managerial incentives, but also on managers' views towards the suitability of this payment scheme. These views can differ between managers for several reasons.
One reason may be that managers differ in their knowledge of the potential advantages and disadvantages of profit sharing. The individual knowledge of the effects of profit sharing depends on the manager's experience, education and social background.
The manager's knowledge also hangs on the extent to which he or she keeps up to date with developments in recent research on profit sharing by attending management seminars or calling in consultants. Moreover, one has to take into account that even scientific insights are often incomplete and fragmentary. This also holds true for research on the determinants and effects of profit sharing. While this research has made progress in analyzing the roles played by work organization, human capital investment and cooperative employeremployee relations, recent research is less conclusive regarding the complementary performance management practices that are required for a successful adoption of profit sharing. There are conflicting findings as to the question of whether or not profit sharing should be combined with other incentive schemes (Barnes et al. 2011 , Pendleton 1997 , Pendleton and Robinson 2015 , Wageman 1995 . This incomplete scientific knowledge leaves room for subjective interpretation.
Even if perfect knowledge of the possible effects of profit sharing was available, managers would still face the problem that they often lack sufficient information about the local conditions at lower levels of hierarchy in the firm. These local conditions can have an important influence on the suitability of profit sharing. For example, while repeated games among workers can potentially solve the free rider problem, a shortcoming of repeated games is that they involve multiple equilibria. Whether profit sharing results in a high-effort equilibrium or a low-effort equilibrium may depend on social relationships between workers and the social norms that evolve within work teams.
These very specific circumstances are difficult to observe for management. Similarly, the extent of peer pressure induced by profit sharing depends on idiosyncratic circumstances such as the workers' propensity to exert pressure and their responsiveness to pressure.
Incomplete information about these specific and idiosyncratic circumstances implies that managers' subjective views about the local conditions influence their attitude toward profit sharing. A manager who expects that employees will get stuck in a low-effort equilibrium is less likely to have a positive attitude than a manager who trusts that employees are able to realize a high-effort equilibrium. Thus, to the extent managers' subjective opinions about unobservable circumstances play a role, their attitudes towards 
Data and Variables

Data Set
The empirical investigation is based on the Hannover Panel, a four-wave panel (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) with data from manufacturing establishments in the federal state of Lower Saxony (Gerlach et al. 2003) . The important advantage of the data set is that it contains information on both profit sharing and managers' attitudes toward profit sharing.
Moreover, it provides a rich set of control variables for objective characteristics of the establishments. This helps isolate the role of managers' attitudes.
Note that the prediction of a link between managerial attitudes and profit sharing is general and does not depend on a specific point in time. Thus, even though the data set used is from the 1990s, it allows testing this theoretical prediction.
The population of the survey consists of all manufacturing establishments with five or more employees. The sample is stratified according to firm size and industry, with an oversampling of larger establishments. The sample was designed in such a way that a sufficient number of cell entries remained after four waves despite sample attrition. In the first wave of interviews (1994), 51 percent of the establishments in the sample agreed to participate. In spite of this non-response rate the difference between the planned and realized stratification is so small that the data are representative of the manufacturing establishments in Lower Saxony in 1994 and in the subsequent waves. The net sample of the first wave was used as the basis for the following waves.
The Hanover Panel was financed by the Volkswagen foundation. Interviews were conducted by Infratest Sozialforschung, a professional survey and opinion research institute. The data were collected on the basis of a questionnaire in personal interviews with the top manager of the establishment. The questionnaire covered various aspects of establishment structure, establishment behavior and establishment performance with an emphasis on issues relating to personnel. A nucleus of themes was addressed annually.
Different additional topics were sampled in consecutive waves.
Information on profit sharing for employees is available from wave 1 (1994) and wave 3 (1996) of the survey. Wave 1 contains information on managers' attitudes toward profit sharing. Thus, managerial attitudes and objective establishment characteristics in 1994 are used to explain changes in the use of profit sharing between the years 1994 and 1996. The data set provides a rich set of control variables. The decision to adopt profit sharing for employees not only depends on managers' attitudes, but also on their incentives. Thus, the regressions include a dummy variable for managerial profit sharing.
Profit Sharing for Employees
Explanatory Variables
Moreover, a dummy for the presence of a works council takes into account that managers' decisions may be influenced by worker representation. Works councils provide a highly developed mechanism for codetermination at the establishment level.
Their creation depends on the initiative of the establishment's workforce.
Establishment size is taken into account by the number of employees. The establishment's investments in the employees' human capital are controlled for by a variable for per capita expenses on further training. The nature of production is captured by variables for the share of university graduates, a research-based strategy, a modern production technology and a participative organization of work. The literature on skillbiased technological and organizational change suggests that these variables reflect more multifaceted and complex tasks (Acemoglu 2002 , Caroli and Van Reenen 2001 , Hellmann and Thiele 2011 , Jirjahn and Kraft 2011 . A dummy for the use of shift work is also included. Shift work is often used in standardized large-scale production that involves less complex tasks (Jirjahn 2008) .
In order to examine if profit sharing and alternative forms of performance pay are complements or substitutes, dummy variables for the use of individual-based and groupbased performance pay are taken into account. Furthermore, variables for single establishment status, an expansive market strategy, the share of part-time employees and the share of temporary workers are included. Finally, 11 sector dummies capture technology differences across industries within manufacturing. Table 3 provides the regression results for the adoption of profit sharing. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the establishment has no profit sharing plan for employees in the year 1994 and has such plan in the year 1996. It is equal to 0 if the establishment has no profit sharing plan for employees in both years. As the dependent variable is dichotomous, we fit the determinants of profit sharing adoption to a cumulative normal function using maximum likelihood probit estimation. In order to examine whether or not the pattern of results changes, we run regressions with three different specifications, a specification including only objective variables, a specification including only subjective variables, and a specification including both types of variables.
Estimation Results
Adoption of Profit Sharing
The specification of regression (1) only accounts for objective establishment characteristics. Several variables take significant coefficients (at the 10 percent level).
The share of university graduates, a participative organization of work and a researchbased strategy are positive determinants of profit sharing adoption. These findings fit the hypothesis that profit sharing is more likely to be adopted if the nature of production is to a larger degree characterized by multi-faceted tasks. The incidence of a works council is also positively associated with the adoption of profit sharing. The result conforms to the notion that the trust-building role of establishment-level codetermination fosters the implementation of profit sharing. The use of group-based performance pay is a negative determinant. This indicates that group-based and firm-wide incentives are substitutes.
Finally, the share of part-time employees emerges as a positive covariate of profit sharing adoption.
In regression (2) , only the two dummy variables for management's attitude towards profit sharing are included. The variable for a very positive managerial attitude takes a positive coefficient that is significant at the 5 percent level. The influence of this variable is also economically meaningful. A very positive attitude towards profit sharing is associated with a 12 percentage point higher probability that profit sharing is adopted.
Regression (2) provides explorative evidence for the hypothesis that subjective factors play a role in the adoption of profit sharing. At issue is, whether this finding also holds in a regression that controls for objective establishment characteristics. Thus, in a further step, variables for managers' attitudes and variables for objective establishment characteristics are jointly included in regression (3). Controlling for objective establishment characteristics even strengthens the result that a very positive managerial attitude is associated with a higher probability of profit sharing adoption. The coefficient is now significant at the 1 percent level. Moreover, the estimated magnitude is higher than that in regression (2) . A very positive managerial attitude towards profit sharing increases the probability of adoption by 14 percentage points. Thus, regression (3) provides no evidence that management's attitudes are simply a reflection of the objective circumstances of the establishment. Quite the contrary, management's attitudes appear to play their own important and strong role in the adoption of profit sharing.
Furthermore, comparing the results of regression (3) with those of regression (1), it can be seen that accounting for subjective factors improves the estimates for the objective establishment characteristics. The coefficients on works council incidence, direct worker participation, and the share of part-time employees are more precisely estimated. They are now significant at the 5 percent level. Moreover, the variables for establishment size and a modern production technology now emerge as significantly positive determinants of profit sharing adoption (at the 10 percent level). Table 4 shows the probit estimates for the termination of profit sharing. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment has a profit sharing plan for employees in the year 1994 but not in the year 1996. It is equal to 0 if the establishment has a profit sharing plan for employees in both years.
Termination of Profit Sharing
Regression (1) only includes variables for objective establishment characteristics.
The share of university graduates is a negative determinant of the termination of profit sharing. Thus, taken together, the results of Tables 3 and 4 suggest that a high share of university graduates not only leads establishments to adopt profit sharing but also to maintain this payment scheme once it has been implemented. Larger establishments are more likely to drop profit sharing. Thus, while larger establishments have a greater propensity to adopt profit sharing plans, they also have a greater probability to terminate existing plans. One explanation for this finding could be that larger firms tend to experiment with profit sharing more often and that this experimentation entails a higher number of less successful trials. Furthermore, the use of group-based performance pay is associated with a higher probability of dropping existing profit sharing plans. This can be seen as a further indication that group-based and firm-wide incentives are rather substitutes. Finally, employer provided further training is a negative determinant of the probability that profit sharing is terminated. The result fits the notion that employers tend to maintain profit sharing in order to safeguard the investments in the workers' human capital.
Regression (2) only includes the dummy variables for managerial attitudes. The regression shows that a very positive attitude is a significantly negative determinant of terminating profit sharing for employees. Thus, taken together, our regressions provide evidence that managers' attitudes play a role in both the decision to adopt profit sharing and the decision to maintain profit sharing. A very positive managerial attitude not only increases the probability of adopting profit sharing, it also increases the probability of a sustained use of profit sharing.
The influence of management's attitude is also economically meaningful. A very positive attitude is associated with a 34 percentage point lower probability that profit sharing is terminated. Taking into account that the predicted probability of dropping profit sharing is about 65 percent in an establishment with no positive managerial attitudes, this implies a decrease by more than one half.
Regression (3) includes both subjective and objective variables. Again, the estimated magnitude of the influence of management's attitude increases when taking objective establishment characteristics into account. A very positive attitude towards profit sharing is now associated with a 49 percentage point lower probability that profit sharing for employees is terminated. Thus, also the regressions on profit sharing termination confirm that subjective factors play their own role. Controlling for objective establishment characteristics yields an even higher estimate of the influence of subjective factors.
Vice versa, the inclusion of the subjective variables also improves the estimates for the objective establishment characteristics. The coefficients on establishment size and group performance pay are now significant at the 5 percent level. Moreover, managerial profit sharing emerges as a significant determinant. If executive managers receive profit sharing, the establishment has a lower probability that profit sharing for employees is dropped. This suggests that not only managers' attitudes but also their incentives play a role in maintaining profit sharing for employees.
Experimentation and Sustained Use
So far our analysis suggests that a very positive managerial attitude stimulates the adoption of profit sharing and contributes to a sustained use of profit sharing. We now expand the analysis to examine if positive managerial attitudes also entail failed experimentation with profit sharing. Thus, in order to obtain further insights into the dynamics of profit sharing use, we define a categorial dependent variable for each establishment i: 0 = i has no profit sharing plan for employees in 1994 and 1996; 1 = i has a profit sharing plan for employees only in 1994; 2 = i has a profit sharing plan for employees only in 1996; 3 = i has a profit sharing plan for employees in 1994 and 1996.
Category 1 captures failed experimentation with profit sharing, category 2 the introduction of profit sharing, and category 3 a sustained use of profit sharing. The determinants of the various categories are estimated by using a multinomial probit model.
For the interpretation of the estimates, it is important to note that the reference group for each of the three categories now uniformly consists of establishments without profit sharing in both years (1994 and 1996) . Table 5 provides the results. A very positive managerial attitude in the year 1994 is associated with a higher probability of the introduction of profit sharing in the period from 1994 to 1996. This result corresponds to the finding shown in Table 3 . Furthermore, a positive and a very positive managerial attitude in 1994 are associated with a higher probability that profit sharing is used in both years 1994 and 1996. This result points into same directions as the finding of Table 4 . Positive managerial attitudes towards profit sharing can contribute to a sustained use of this payment scheme.
Finally, a positive and a very positive managerial attitude in the year 1994 are associated with an increased likelihood that the establishment has profit sharing for employees only in 1994 but not in 1996. This novel result shows the role of positive managerial attitudes in a more differentiated light. It indicates that positive managerial attitudes to some extent also entail the adoption of profit sharing plans which turn out to be a failure. In 1994, management holds a positive view about a profit sharing plan adopted in the previous years. Nonetheless the plan is dropped in the subsequent two years. As suggested by our background discussion, management may initially have a positive view towards profit sharing even though this view does not necessarily match the objective circumstances of the establishment. In that case, management adopts profit sharing for employees and recognizes later on that this payment scheme is not that successful as expected. This leads management to drop it.
Altogether, our estimates suggest the following pattern of dynamics: Positive managerial attitudes translate into a higher likelihood of initiating profit sharing. On the one hand, profit sharing plans are implemented that are used in a sustained matter. On the other hand, profit sharing plans are adopted that prove to be a failure and so are dropped in the end. The marginal effects show that both scenarios are economically meaningful. A very positive managerial attitude is associated with a 20 percentage point higher probability of sustained use and 7 percentage point higher probability of failed experimentation. For a positive managerial attitude, the respective numbers are 4 and 6 percentage points.
Conclusions
From a theoretical viewpoint, discretionary power in decision making leaves room for managers to follow their subjective attitudes towards profit sharing. These attitudes can differ for several reasons. Depending on their experience and education, managers may differ in their knowledge of the potential advantages and disadvantages of profit sharing.
Taking into account that also scientific insights into the effects of profit sharing are incomplete and fragmentary, there appears to be ample room for subjective interpretation. 
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